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ABSTRACT
Instead of delegating control over private data to single large
corporations, in friend-to-friend (F2F) systems users take
control over their data into their own hands and they com-
municate only with users whom they know. In this paper we
propose a push-pull-clone model for trust-based collabora-
tive editing with contract deployed over F2F network. Peo-
ple specify contracts when they share data to their friends. A
log auditing protocol is used to detect user’s misbehavior if
they do not respect contracts after they received data. Users
maintain locally trust values on other users and these val-
ues are adjusted according to auditing results. We evaluate
proposed model by using PeerSim simulator and experiment
results show the feasibility of our model.
INTRODUCTION
Most platforms hosting social services such as Facebook or
Twitter rely on a central authority and place personal infor-
mation in the hands of a single large corporation which is a
perceived privacy threat. Users must provide and store their
data to vendors of these services and have to trust that they
will preserve privacy of their data, but they have little con-
trol over the usage of their data after sharing it with other
users. Peer-to-peer networks allow decentralization of these
social services. Friend-to-friend (F2F) networks is a cate-
gory of peer-to-peer networks where users have control over
their data as they allow direct connection only between users
who know each other. Restricting connections only between
users that know each other solves a set of security problems
in peer-to-peer networks such as the issue that a user appears
under many identities. In F2F networks users have a unique
identity and when a user collaborates with a friend it means
that friend is well-known and trusted.
Dan Brickklin1 has coined the term of F2F networking as
1http://www.bricklin.com/f2f.htm
“The simplification of restricting a network to computers
you know, trust, and control is one method of dealing with
trust issues in sharing”. If users misbehave and their misbe-
havior is detected, the unique identification of users allows
a punishment procedure to be adopted for these users. How-
ever, the challenge is how to detect if users misbehave and
how to design the punishment procedure.
In this paper we focus on the application of F2F network
for collaborative editing of shared documents. Collaborative
editing systems allow a group of people to produce works
together through individual contributions. Collaborators can
edit together on articles, proposals, memos, etc. There are
a wide range of users of CES such as students, professors,
authors of a paper, journalists, editor, internal bloggers, etc.
Handling the document in collaborative environment man-
ner requires interactions between users. With F2F comput-
ing infrastructure, users only connect to trusted friends. Trust
is a key ingredient for collaborative relationships of people
and it requires repeated interactions to build trust based on
experiences over time. Trust is mutable and not completely
transitive between friends, and it is required to have a mech-
anism to update trust eventually. Distributed version con-
trol systems such as Git2 and Mercurial3 adopt a variation of
the friend-to-friend model of collaboration where users pull
changes from other users that they trust. These systems are
mainly used by developers in open-source projects. Even if a
trust network is built between developers based on previous
experience, trust is not explicitly evaluated.
In a friend-to-friend collaboration it is very difficult to en-
sure that after data is shared with other users, these users
will not misbehave and violate data privacy. Usage con-
trol mechanisms model contracts that users receive together
with data which refer to what happens to data after it has
been released to authorized people, for example, how they
may, should and should not use it. However, existing usage
control approaches rely on some central authorities that can
check violation of contracts. These solutions are not suitable
for F2F based collaboration where no user has control over
another user to audit his behavior and a user can observe
only behavior of collaborating users.
2http://git-scm.com/
3http://mercurial.selenic.com/
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In this paper, we propose a novel trust management mecha-
nism adapted for friend-to-friend collaborative editing with
contracts. Each user maintains a local workspace that con-
tains local data as well as modifications done on the shared
data and contracts related to usage policy of the shared data.
The logged modifications and contracts are shared with other
users. Each user performs a log auditing mechanism for de-
tecting misbehaving users and adjusts their trust values ac-
cording to audit result.
The paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting
a motivating example. We then go on by presenting related
approaches. We give an overview of the collaboration model
that we propose, of the logging mechanism and the proper-
ties it has to ensure and of the contract specification. We then
briefly describe our solution to assess trust. We also provide
some results of the simulations to evaluate the efficiency of
our mechanism. We end our paper with some concluding
remarks and directions for future work.
EXAMPLE
Let us give a simple example for illustrating how collabora-
tive editing with contract is deployed over a F2F network.
Let us consider a F2F network composed of five users A,
B, C, D and E in which each user is at least in one friend
relationship with another user. Users share and edit collab-
oratively a document. At the beginning this F2F network is
built based on social trust between users and connections are
established only between friends. Friends trust their friends
with different trust levels that are updated according to their
collaboration experience. For instance, A has B and C as
friends, however, A has different trust levels for B and C
and thus gives them different contracts over the shared doc-
ument. For instance, A gives to B the permission to edit the
document, while he/she gives to C only the permission to
view the document. Also, A gives C an obligation to send
feedback while this obligation is not required to B. Receivers
are expected to follow these contracts. Otherwise, their trust
levels will be adjusted once misbehavior is detected. To
our knowledge there is no existing model for collaborative
editing which considers trust with self-auditing and updat-
ing mechanism of trust levels.
RELATED WORK
Our approach based on trust management is different from
access control mechanisms. Instead of enforcing granted
rights a-priori as in traditional access control mechanisms,
we check contracts a-posteriori once data has been shared.
Similarly, there exist some optimistic access control approaches
[11] that check a-posteriori access policies. In these ap-
proaches, if user actions violate granted rights, a recovery
mechanism is applied and all carried-out operations are re-
moved. Usually, this recovery mechanism requires a central-
ized authority that ensures that the recovery is taken by the
whole system. However, the recovery mechanism is diffi-
cult to be applied in F2F system where a user does not have
knowledge of the global network of collaboration. Gener-
ally, access control mechanisms aim at ensuring that systems
are used correctly by authorized users with authorized ac-
tions. Rather than ensuring a hard system security, we adopt
a flexible trust management mechanism that helps users col-
laborate with other users they trust.
In the last decade friend-to-Friend (F2F) computing emerged
as a new paradigm in which users only make direct connec-
tions with people they know. Freenet [1] is a well-known
F2F network whose main design goals are censorship resis-
tance and anonymity. Freenet can operate in the classical
F2F (darknet) mode where the users can only join the net-
work only if they know a member of the network, but also in
the opennet mode in which anyone can join. In [2] authors
outline solutions of using F2F computing for building decen-
tralized social networks, for data access control and for data
storage. In [8] authors describe the F2F computing frame-
work to spontaneously setup Desktop Grids with friends or
colleagues via instant messaging. While most of existing
F2F networks are used for file sharing and instant messag-
ing, we propose F2F computing for deploying trust-based
applications such as decentralized collaborative editing with
trust.
Trust management is an important aspect of the solution that
we proposed. The concept of trust in different communi-
ties varies according to how it is computed and used. Our
work relies on the concept of trust which is based on past en-
counters [7]. With F2F networks users bring social trust into
the system. However trust is not immutable and it changes
time to time. Thus a trust model still be useful for F2F net-
work. Various trust models for decentralized systems exist
such as NICE model [10], EigenTrust model [4]. As taxon-
omy of trust in [6], trust model includes information gath-
ering, scoring and ranking, response. Most of existing P2P
trust models propose mechanism to update trust values based
on direct interactions between peers while we use log audit-
ing to help one user evaluates others either through direct or
indirect interactions. Our mechanism for discovering misbe-
haved users can be coupled with any existing trust model in
order to manage user trust values.
Keeping and managing event logs is frequently used for en-
suring security and privacy. This approach has been studied
in many works. In [3], a log auditing approach is used for
detecting misbehavior in collaborative work environments,
where a small group of users share a large number of doc-
uments and policies. In [5, 9], a logical policy-centric for
behavior-based decision-making is presented. The frame-
work consists of a formal model of past behaviors of prin-
cipals which is based on event structures. However, these
models require a central authority that has the ability to ob-
serve all actions of all users. This assumption is not valid in
a F2F setting. Our proposed log-auditing mechanism works
for a F2F collaboration and its complexity compared to the
centralized solution comes from the fact that each user has
only a partial overview of the global collaboration and can
audit only users with whom he collaborates. Therefore, a
user can take decisions only from the information he pos-
sesses from the users with whom he collaborates.
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SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we are going to present collaborative editing
system based on push-pull-clone model deployed over the
F2F network. The collaboration implies the interactions be-
tween users under given contract. Our work focuses on log-
ging mechanism which mainly point are to ensure causality
of not only editing operations but also of contracts and to
perform synchronizing correctly. We move toward first with
the infrastructure of F2F network applied for our push-pull-
clone model.
Push-pull-clone model over F2F computing
Figure 1. Push-pull-clone model in peer-to-peer network. Without
trust management, users might push private data to malicious user,
and pull respectively. With trust management, users discard all com-
munications to/from malicious users since such users are detected as
bad users (e.g. when D changes from good to bad).
Push-pull-clone is a native direct pair-wise communication
between users. Users can collaborate without having to give
everyone direct write access to their document. To work with
others a user simply sets up a local workspace for his own
work, and uses a F2F network to PUSH his document to
trusted friends. Others can then get the document by doing
CLONE the document from the user’s workspace to have
independent local workspace for the document of the user,
do their changes locally and publish them by doing PUSH.
The user then does PULL to get the changes into his local
workspace. The push-pull-clone model is used for efficient
distributed collaboration and it was already implemented in
distributed version control systems such as Git, Mercurial.
Figure 2. Friend-to-Friend network with trust. Collaborations are es-
tablished between friends only. No collaboration between A and B (also
A and D) since A might trust B but B does not trust A (respectively A
and D). Trust is not transitive between friends (between A, E, and D).
In Figure 1, there are two scenarios of push-pull-clone model
for collaborative editing with and without trust management.
In the former without trust management, users share and rec-
oncile replicas with any one another regardless such user
is good or bad. Such collaboration could be in danger of
accepting bad content from malicious users who attempts
to steal information or disturb the cooperation. The later
scenario supports only push-pull-clone interactions between
trusted users (so-called friends). It works also with the case
a user changes his behavior from good to bad, thus his trust
or reputation becomes less, therefore his communications in
collaboration will be discarded.
In Figure 2 sharing data as well as cooperation are performed
between friends only. The network structure is not immutable
since each member can change behavior over time. Thus,
their trust levels are adjusted mainly based on their past be-
havior. A misbehavior detection mechanism and trust model
to manage trust levels of friends are mandatory to maintain
correctly such network. Next, we present our solution serv-
ing for auditing misbehavior and updating trust levels.
Log
Our system keeps document as a log of operations that have
been done during collaborative process. The log records
more about the process of collaboration itself, and not just
output document. From the log it is possible to see who
contributes what, and when. The outcome of collaborative
editing needs to be a document and it could be obtained by
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replaying the editing operations from the log.
The document on which users collaborate together is repli-
cated at sites of all users. In our model the changes are prop-
agated in weakly consistent manner. It means user can de-
cide when, with whom and what data to be sent and synchro-
nized. We use the push-pull-clone communication between
replicas and the ordered exchange of operations stored in
each replica logs. A replica log contains all operations that
have been generated locally or received from other users.
Users store operations in their logs in an order that is con-
sistent with generated order. Pair-wise communication sup-
ports the synchronization of any two users. The term event
presents editing operations and communication action such
as share. The following rules are used for logging:
• Each new event generated locally is added to the end of
local log in the order of occurrence.
• The events from remote log that should be merged are
added to the end of local log in the order they appeared
in the remote log.
• When a user shares the document with other users the
share events together with the specified contracts are logged
in the local log of the receiving user. However, we make
the assumption that a user is unwilling to disclose with all
collaborating friends all the sharing events and contracts
that he specifies to a certain friend. That is why sharing
events and contracts are not kept in the local log of the
sending user.
We use anti-entropy update for new changes from others logs
received. New changes are appended to the end of the log.
A user might discard changes from a received log in case of
contract conflict. The merging mechanism ensures causal-
ity of editing operations as well as between operation and
contract. We discuss in detail about these properties in next
parts.
Causality preservation
Many distributed systems consider causality preservation as
a requirement and they use techniques such as state vectors
and causal barriers for ensuring it. In our model, it is manda-
tory to respect the following causalities.
• Causality between local operations is respected by adding
events to the log in order they were generated.
• Causality between local operations and received remote
operations re respected by anti-entropy updating for new
changes. Also the propagating of the whole log ensures
that order of events are not changeable.
• Causality between contracts and operations must be en-
sured in order to enforce users following given usage con-
dition. Otherwise their violations are detected to perform
judgments. Log itself cannot prevent users from changing
this causality up on their purpose. Thus we use signature-
based authenticators to ensure correctness of the log.
• Causality between received contracts and contracts give
to one another in order to ensure user should use data
based on usage policy (through contract) he receives. This
causality also is preserved with authenticators.
Contract specification
Contract is a need for trustful collaborative interactions. In
our collaborative editing model, contract expressed usage
policy which are the obligation, permission, omission and
prohibition (or forbidden) which one user gives to others
when he shares data. These four notions are objects of de-
ontic logic. The specification of contracts needs to capture
the causality of deontic objects, thus it needs to use tempo-
ral logic. The contracts in our model are built on the top
of a basic deontic logic, in combination with operators from
temporal logic, and operation-based.
Deontic logic is the logic concerned with normative notions
such as obligation, permission, omission, prohibition, etc.
Deontic itself when restricted to specific domain is a practi-
cal powerful specification tool, and if combined with other
useful temporal concepts. Due to the huge scope of things
can be expressed by deontic logic, we restrict our work with-
ing deontic modalities of Obligation, Permission, Forbidden,
Omission (denoted as O, P, F, M).
The contracts are expression of deontic notions over opera-
tions in CES. If op is an operation then the primitive con-
tract cop based on op is defined using the modalities: Fop,
Oop, Pop, Mop and to be respectively read “contract c says
that it is forbidden to do the operation op (or obliged, per-
mitted, omitted)”. The composite regulation (simply called
contract) C can be composed of one or several primitive con-
tracts. In order to obtain single composite contract, primitive
contracts are merged together, however, the conflict arises in
merging primitive contracts together. Primitive contracts are
conflict in cases: Oop ✠O¬op, Pop ✠Fop, Oop ✠Mop. Con-
flict can be resolved by detecting conflict contracts and giv-
ing them the priority of one over the other (so-called domi-
nance). User can also overrides his own contracts in collab-
oration process with one another user.
AUDITING AND TRUST ASSESSMENT
We consider a collaborating system where each user is sup-
posed to respect given contract. If it does, then we call
the user trusted; otherwise we call the user distrusted or
suspected. There are two ways in which a user cannot be
trusted: it can either do actions violating contract or ignore
an obligation. Ideally, if a user misbehaves in either of these
ways, other users should detect his misbehavior. A user is
considered as distrusted if it violates a contract, and a user
is considered as suspected if he does not prove that he con-
forms to an obligation. For instance, a user that receives the
obligation “should send back” the document, but he never
fulfills this obligation is considered suspected. Note that
user u withdraws the suspected indication on user v when
he finds that user v fulfilled the obligation he was suspected
for.
Cheaters may try to hide their misbehavior by modifying
the log. Briefly, a user u is considered cheater if he mod-
ifies the log that consequently affects auditing result. For
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instance, u removes some obligations that he does not want
to be enforced to follow. The log auditing mechanism should
guarantee also that users cannot modify the log. To prevent
log modification, we use authenticators for patches of op-
erations. Due to the space limitation, we do not present in
this paper our solution about generation and verification of
authenticators. The audit mechanism can generate only four
types of results: trusted, distrusted, suspected and cheater.
The auditing protocol is performed at any time at local sites.
We denote Trustlogu (v) as the trust value that a user u as-
signs to user v. All users are set an initial default trust
value such as real life social trust. The user u updates value
Trust
log
u (v) for user v mainly based on the result of log
analysis. In order to manage trust values for user v, we can
use an existing decentralized trust model. When an assessed
user v is detected as distrusted or suspected, his local trust
value is recomputed by assessing user u using a trust model.
The total local trust values could be aggregated from log-
based trust, reputation and recommendation trust. The trust
computation to get total trust values varies from trust mod-
els. Details of trust model are not presented in this paper.
Our approach for trust assessment uses log auditing. The vi-
olation in case a cheater copies the content of a document in
order to create a new one and then claims to be the document
owner can not be detected by log auditing. However, the log
could be used to discover the history of actions on document
that helps to detect cheaters.
EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of the proposed
model through simulation using PeerSim4 simulator. We fo-
cus first on the ability of detecting cheaters; then we estimate
the overhead generated by the usage of contracts.
We setup the simulation with a network of 200 users where
some of them are defined as cheaters. Due to the unavailabil-
ity of real data traces of F2F collaboration as well as traces
with contracts, we generate randomly the data flow of collab-
oration during the simulation, i.e operations, contracts and
users with whom to share. One interaction is defined as the
process of sharing a log with the specified contracts, from
one user to one another. Since the total number of interac-
tions generated must be pseudo uniformly distributed over
all users, we let one user perform sharing to not exceed 3
other users at each step. Similarly, the number of operations
and contracts generated by one user each time is at most 10
operations and 3 contracts (if we consider only 3 types of
actions in our system: insertion, deletion and sharing).
Experiment 1: misbehavior detection
To evaluate the ability of misbehavior detection, we check
first the ability to detect a selected cheater according to the
total number of interactions performed by all users. The es-
timation is performed on the collaborative network with 60
cheaters (30% of users are cheaters). The auditing process
is performed after each synchronization with another user.
4http://peersim.sourceforge.net/
We select randomly one cheater to be audited, and we ob-
serve how many percent of users can detect him. Figure 3
shows the results collected after each cycle. We can see that
the cheater is detected by a few users at the beginning, then
more user can detect him when more interactions are per-
formed.
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Figure 3. Ability to detect one selected cheater according to the total
number of interactions in the collaborative network.
Second, we check the percentage of cheaters that can be de-
tected. We select randomly one honest user from the net-
work to observe how many percent of cheaters he can de-
tect. Figure 4, shows the result according to the number of
synchronizations done by the selected user with others. We
can see from the graph, that up to 20% of cheaters are de-
tected after the first four synchronizations (audit done four
times), and after the fifth synchronization more than 80% of
cheaters are already detected. Only about 10% of cheaters
may require more interactions to be detected.
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Figure 4. Percentage of detected cheaters according to the number of
synchronizations done by the selected honest user.
In order to have a global view about the evolution of the
percentage of detected cheaters, we compute the average
value of detected cheaters over all users of the collabora-
tive network. Figure 5 shows, on average, how many per-
cent of cheaters are detected by one user. We perform the
experiment in case of a low, medium and high population
of cheaters in the network (respectively 5%, 30%, 80% of
cheaters). The results show that the system still functions
well in case of a high/low population of cheaters.
Experiment 2: overhead estimation
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Figure 5. Average percentage of detected cheaters according to the total
number of interactions in the collaborative network.
In this experiment we evaluate the time overhead generated
by the usage of contracts for the synchronization and the
auditing process. We compare two collaborative models:
with and without contracts. In the model with contracts, the
synchronization includes merging logs which contain opera-
tions and contracts, replaying editing operations, and audit-
ing misbehavior. In the model without contracts, the syn-
chronization is simply performed by anti-entropy update.
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Figure 6. Synchronization time with growing of number of operations
We perform an experiment where we use the same data flow
for each model, and we compute the total time (T) of all
the synchronizations performed by a given user. i.e. T =∑
ti, where ti is the time required for the i
th synchroniza-
tion. Figure 6 shows the result according to the number of
operations in the local log. From the obtained results, we can
see that the time overhead generated by the usage of con-
tracts, is reasonable, since the difference between the time
computed for both models, increase slowly with the number
of operations. Our experimental evaluation shows the feasi-
bility of the proposed method for detecting cheaters during
collaboration over F2F network even with a high population
of dishonest users.
CONCLUSION
We presented a push-pull-clone collaborative editing model
over a friend-to-friend network where users share their pri-
vate data by specifying some contracts that receivers must
follow. Trust values are adapted according to users’ past be-
havior regarding conformance to received contracts. Modi-
fications done by users on the shared data and the contracts
that must be followed when data is shared are logged in a
distributed manner. A mechanism of distributed log audit-
ing is applied during collaboration and users that did not
conform to the required contracts are detected and therefore
their trust value is updated. Any distributed trust model can
be applied to our proposed mechanism. We implemented
the proposed collaboration model and we performed simu-
lations using PeerSim peer-to-peer simulator. Experiment
results show the feasibility of our model.
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